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Prediction markets generally are small-scale electronic markets that tie payoffs to 
measurable future events.  They are similar to stock markets, where the ―stocks‖ are 
outcomes or events rather than shares in a company.  The growing popularity of 
prediction markets reflects the notion that markets are an excellent means of efficient 
information aggregation among a disparate group of people.  Trading prices in the 
prediction markets provide decision makers with a timely, accurate, and continuously 
updated picture on the likelihood of future events.  This enables decision makers to better 
evaluate risk.  Based on historical successes in prediction market utilization, it is both 
logical and important to assess the usefulness of prediction markets in acquisition 
programs.  This thesis evaluates the usefulness of prediction markets in the Department 
of Defense (DoD) acquisition field. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Prediction markets—also known as information markets, internal markets, 
decision markets, or futures markets—collect and gather information from a number of 
people to make a prediction about a future event.  Information is gathered by buying and 
selling shares in alternative outcomes for some future event.  The idea is that every 
person in the market has a small piece of information about the future event, and the most 
likely outcome will be identified when information is aggregated via a prediction market.  
Traders use their best information when buying and selling contracts because incentives 
are tied to accurate predictions, not biased expectations.  ―In a truly efficient prediction 
market, the market price will be the best predictor of the event, and no combination of 
available polls or other information can be used to improve on the market-generated 
forecasts‖ (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004, p. 108).  From the prediction market outcome, 
management can make strategic decisions about future sales or products.   
The range of current applications includes political elections, entertainment, 
sports, science and technology developments, commodities futures, current events, and 
economic data.  ―[Prediction markets] are practical for corporate strategists given that 
internal markets can stream decentralized intelligence into accurate predictions about 
future events‖ (Corporate Executive Board, 2006, p. 2).  A number of companies 
currently use prediction markets, including Hewlett-Packard (HP), Microsoft, Google, 
Yahoo, Siemens, Eli Lilly, and others.   
The Department of Defense (DoD) attempted to use prediction markets in the past 
but was met with political pressure to discontinue their use.  After the intelligence 
community‘s failure to efficiently aggregate intelligence information prior to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) created a Policy Analysis Market (PAM) to predict terror attacks and other 
political events around the world.  PAM was subsequently cancelled in 2003, one day 
after it was announced.  The controversy with PAM arose from the concern that 
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individuals could manipulate and profit from this market, including potential terrorists.  
The goal of this thesis is not to predict political or terror events, but to provide 
management with an additional forecasting tool to make informed decisions about 
programs and projects.   
B. BENEFIT OF THESIS 
With the current and future pressures on the Defense budget, this thesis will 
investigate the benefits and limitations of prediction markets as an additional 
(complementary) tool to manage a portfolio of acquisition programs.  The potential role 
of prediction markets in portfolio management would be to help forecast which programs 
are most likely to succeed, where success means that the program is on or under budget, 
on or ahead of schedule, and meeting technical performance requirements or objectives.  
In addition, success means viability in the real world (i.e., would the end product be 
effective for the end user).  Prediction markets have been extensively investigated in 
controlled settings, and private sector companies have used prediction markets in the past 
to help forecast the potential market success of products in their research and 
development (R&D) portfolios.  This thesis will review the applications and results of 
prediction markets in such environments, and deduce if and how the DoD can best 
implement prediction markets as a management tool. 
C. THESIS SCOPE 
Private sector companies have used prediction markets to help manage research 
and development portfolios, employing these prediction markets to forecast which 
products will achieve technical objectives, be successful at market, as well as avoid cost 
and schedule overruns.  Current and future budget constraints have led to much 
discussion on cutting certain acquisition programs in the DoD.  Prediction markets could 
potentially be used to assist with decisions regarding which programs to cut based on 
potential success, and cost and schedule overruns.  This thesis explores the feasibility of 
using prediction markets as a management tool in the DoD.  By reviewing past prediction 
market applications and results, the research will analyze if and how prediction markets 
can best be used in the DoD acquisition process.   
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D. METHODOLOGY 
The approach to this thesis will primarily focus on reviewing information 
currently available on prediction markets. The literature review will investigate: 
 How and why prediction markets work in principle 
 How the performance or ―success‖ of prediction markets is 
measured 
 The market design elements that must be chosen and calibrated in 
developing and implementing prediction markets 
 How prediction markets are applied in private sector companies 
 How prediction markets are applied to forecast the outcome of 
other ―real world‖ events (elections, sporting contests, motion 
picture success) 
The thesis will then make a connection between these previous prediction market 
applications and results to the DoD.  Specifically, the primary objective is to determine 
how DoD can use prediction markets to manage a portfolio of acquisition programs. 
E.  ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The thesis begins with an overview of prediction markets; specifically, what they 
are and why they are valuable.  Next, the market elements and decision variables in 
prediction market design are investigated.  The decision variables play a key role in 
prediction market success or failure.  Then, the thesis discusses measures of performance 
or success of a prediction market.  This can prove difficult in real world environments.  
Prediction markets measure probabilities of different outcomes.  If a prediction market 
indicates one outcome has a higher probability than another alternative outcome, but the 
lower probability event occurs, it does not mean that the prediction market misjudged the 
probabilities; low probability events do occur. 
Furthermore, prediction markets can only be as accurate as the information 
available to the market participants.  The fact that the market gets it wrong may simply 
indicate the information available was low quality.  Similarly, accurate prediction market 
outcomes may simply indicate such an abundance of accurate information that any 
 
  4 
forecast could be correct.  The most relevant test for prediction market performance is 
whether repeated prediction market outcomes more accurately reflect the probabilities of 
actual outcomes than alternative forecasting techniques.   
Private sector applications and results are evaluated, along with other ―real world‖ 
applications and results.  Finally, the thesis connects prediction market applications to the 
DoD.  Specifically, how might the DoD use prediction markets to aid in controlling 
acquisition costs and schedule overruns. 
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II. PREDICTION MARKETS: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHY 
THEY ARE (POTENTIALLY) VALUABLE 
Prediction markets, in their simplest form, collect and gather information from a 
number of people to make a prediction about a future event.  The idea is that each person 
has a small piece of information, and by collecting and aggregating all the information, 
each can make the most accurate possible prediction.  Predicting the outcome of 
uncertain events like political or sporting events, sales forecasts, or macroeconomic 
indicators clearly requires that we have relevant and sufficient information with which to 
make our predictions as accurate as possible.  Information that is typically relevant is not 
concentrated in the hands of one person, or even a few people.  Instead, it is distributed 
between many people, each of whom is likely to have a small bit of pertinent knowledge.  
An optimal solution would be to ask all these people to share what they know and to 
aggregate all the information they have.  To ―poll‖ every individual would require a lot of 
time, effort, and money, so this method is not feasible.  A prediction market is a relatively 
low cost and efficient means of ―polling‖ a large number of individuals.  
The following is a simple example of how information aggregation is beneficial 
(Kalovcova, 2007): Let us assume there are six possible states A, B, …, F, all with the 
same initial probability of occurring.  Five individuals receive a private signal.  The 
signal is drawn from an urn where the true state (for this example, we assume it is ‗A‘) is 
represented by five balls and the remaining five states (B through F) are represented by 
two balls each.  The probability of drawing the correct signal is therefore one third (five 
out of fifteen), and the probability of drawing the wrong signal is two thirds (ten out of 
fifteen).  Each individual draws three balls, with the following results: 
 
 
The first individual thinks the true state is ‗A‘ and is right, the second thinks the true state 
is ‗E‘ and is wrong, and the remaining three individuals have no ability to predict the true 
state based on the signal they received, but think any of three possible states are equally 
AAB AEE ABF ACD CDF 
    
   A    E    ?    ?    ? 
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likely.  The aggregated information (AAAAA, BB, CC, DD, EE, and FF) provides a 
much stronger signal about the true state compared to the private signal of any single 
individual.  The problem is the difficulty in finding all the individuals who possess some 
relevant information, and encouraging individuals to reveal their signals truthfully.  For 
both reasons, prediction markets are used as a mechanism for individuals to truthfully 
reveal their information. 
Prediction markets usually provide quite accurate forecasts, and have typically 
outperformed alternative prediction tools.  One key benefit of markets is that they 
motivate traders to re-evaluate the quality of their information on an ongoing basis 
because trading continues as new information is revealed. 
The power of prediction markets derives from the fact that they provide 
incentives for truthful revelation, they provide incentives for research and 
information discovery, and the market provides an algorithm for 
aggregating opinions. (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004, p. 121) 
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III. DESIGN ISSUES/DECISION VARIABLES OF PREDICTION 
MARKETS 
The success of prediction markets, like any market, depends on their design and 
implementation.  Some design issues include how buyers are matched to sellers (market 
design), the specification of the contract (contract type), whether real money is used 
(payoff type), and whether enough information exists within the participant pool to 
provide a basis for trading and support accurate predictions (participant quality). 
A. MARKET DESIGN 
Most prediction markets match buyers and sellers through a continuous double 
auction mechanism.  Buyers submit bids and sellers submit asking prices, and the 
mechanism executes a trade whenever the two sides reach a mutually agreeable price; 
this market design requires a large bidder pool so that buyers and sellers can be readily 
matched.  Another method is the pari-mutual system, where all of the money that is bet 
goes into a common pot and is then divided among the winners.  This system is common 
in horse race betting.  Lastly, markets may also use a market maker who announces 
willingness to buy and sell at a certain range of prices.  The market maker determines 
price using a pricing algorithm and executes trades regardless of whether there are buyers 
and sellers on both sides of the market.  This mechanism is beneficial when liquidity in 
the market is limited and places a great deal of risk on the market maker. 
B. CONTRACT TYPE 
A prediction market motivates people to make predictions based on their best 
information.  For the markets to work well, the contracts must be well defined, easily 
understandable, and tied to a specific event occurring at some fixed point in time.   
Table 1 summarizes the three main types of contracts in prediction markets.  First, 
in a ―winner-take-all‖ contract, the contract costs $p, where $p < 1, and pays off $1, if 
and only if a specific event occurs.  The price of a winner-take-all market represents the 
market‘s expectation of the probability that the event will occur.  Second, an ―index‖ 
contract price provides payoffs that vary continuously based on an index number, like the 
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number of units sold or percent of the total votes received.  Bidders purchase contracts if 
they expect the final outcome to exceed the level indicated by the current price, and sell 
shares if they expect the fixed outcome to fall short of the currently predicted level.  The 
price of an index contract represents the market‘s mean expected value of the outcome.  
Finally, in ―spread‖ betting, traders differentiate themselves by bidding on the cutoff that 
determines whether an event occurs, like whether sales volume will exceed a certain 
threshold.  The outcome of a spread market can yield the market‘s expectation of the 
median outcome. 
Additionally, a family of prediction markets can be used to evaluate uncertainty 
of the expectations of the event.  For instance, a family of winner-take-all contracts that 
pay off only if the sales volume is either less than 10 units, greater than 10 but less than 
20 units, greater than 20 but less than 30 units, and so on, reveals almost the entire 
probability distribution of the market‘s expectation.  Experience at Microsoft has shown 
that using multiple contracts, and revealing the market‘s probability distribution, results 
in the most accurate prediction (Corporate Executive Board, 2006).  Figure 1 illustrates 
that a market using multiple contracts results in a probability distribution of the most 
likely range of outcomes. 
 
Figure 1.   Multiple Contract Results (Illustrative Example) 
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Table 1.   Contract Types (From Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004) 
Contract Example Details Reveals market 
expectation of… 
Winner-take-all Event: Sales volume 
is greater than X units. 
Contract pays $1 if 
event occurs. 
Probability that event 
will occur. 
Index Contract pays $1 for 
every unit sold. 
If 51 units are sold, 
the contract pays $51. 
Mean value of 
expected outcome. 
Spread Contract pays 
additional money if 
sales volume is more 
than a given 
threshold. 
Contract costs $1. If 
spread is fixed at 45 
units and sales are 
>45 units, contract 
pays $2. If not, 
contract pays nothing. 
Median value of 
expected outcome. 
 
C. PAYOFF TYPE 
The appropriate incentive structure must also exist.  The market may be designed 
well with appropriate trading mechanisms and contract types, but may fail if there is no 
motivation to trade.  This raises the question of whether to use real money or play money 
markets.  With play money, participants are provided an initial endowment and are 
presumed to be motivated to maximize the final value of this endowment after a 
predetermined trading window.  With real money, participants may be given an initial 
endowment of real money, or they may be expected to invest their personal funds; they 
are presumably motivated to earn as much money as possible over the trading window. 
According to Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), there has been no difference in the 
performance of real versus play money markets.  Some early adopters indicated 
employee resistance to prediction markets because they disagreed with the idea of market 
incentives.  Critics argue that prediction markets generate predictions that a company 
presumes its employees are supposed to provide anyway (Corporate Executive Board, 
2006).  For instance, at Beta the toughest thing was getting agreement on the incentive 
structure.  An IT Research Manager at Beta states it best:  
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A group of people will think that monetary incentives are worthwhile 
given the potential uses and benefits of market predictions.  But, on the 
flipside, another group believes that incentives are inappropriate, taking 
issue with paying people for their knowledge when forecasting is a part of 
the job they do. 
The goal of the incentive structure is to encourage market participation to achieve the 
most accurate result possible.  To aggregate all the information available, participation by 
those with the knowledge is necessary, and the participants must be motivated to trade. 
D. PARTICIPANT QUALITY 
Another decision factor is selecting the traders.  Participants need to be selected 
carefully to ensure no one with relevant information is overlooked.  The mix of traders 
needs to be diverse, so that people bring different pieces of information to the table.  
Additionally, one must decide whether to include uninformed traders in the market or to 
allow only informed participants.  Uninformed traders are market participants who have 
little or no information regarding the future event on which the market focuses.  
Uninformed traders expand the participant pool and generate liquidity.  The downside to 
uninformed traders is their potential lack of interest in participating.  Designers at Beta 
and Siemens strived for a diverse group of participants in their markets, including 
employees from all divisions of the company.  
Along with trader selection, educating participants is just as important.  It is 
important for traders to re-evaluate their information often.  ―Inexperienced traders tend 
to make one trade in the early stages of the market and then not participate for the 
remainder of the time.  Veteran traders participate actively by gathering new information 
from the market, monitoring the trading behavior of others, and re-evaluating their own 
information‖ (Corporate Executive Board, 2006).  The most practical way to train 
participants is to set up experimental markets so traders can figure out how the market 
works and gain the experience necessary to be better participants.  Research has also 
shown that market prediction accuracy increases through additional repetitions as 
participants gain experience in how prediction markets work. 
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IV. MEASURING PERFORMANCE OR SUCCESS 
The following features make markets more effective compared to traditional 
tools. 
A. ANONYMITY 
When a manager asks a direct report to predict a business outcome or whether a 
project will be successful, the response is invariably impacted by what the manager wants 
to hear.  Anonymity frees traders from this constraint. 
B. INCENTIVES 
Market incentives mean that participants trade on their best information and what 
they truly believe will happen.  This greatly reduces the effects of bias found in 
traditional forecast methods. 
C. RANGE OF OUTCOMES 
A well-run prediction market includes contracts tied to both positive and negative 
outcomes.  This forces the recognition that failure is possible, and if the market indicates 
that failure is likely, the organization can adjust accordingly.  
D. REAL-TIME UPDATES 
Contract prices update in real-time and reflect traders‘ shifting beliefs as they 
obtain new information.  This is in contrast to other tools, such as surveys, which produce 
static data and must be rerun to obtain new information. 
For these reasons, markets are generally more accurate than traditional forecasts, 
and even inaccurate markets provide valuable information.  Markets are as useful for 
what they reveal about employee beliefs as for their predictions.  The fact that employees 
are irrationally optimistic or pessimistic is useful in and of itself. 
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It is important to realize that the markets will always tell you something, whether 
they are accurate or not.  You may learn about the perceptions of employees, or simply 
that there was not enough information to garner an accurate forecast.  Regardless, the 
outcomes of a market prediction should not be thrown to the wayside.  Markets gauge the 
sentiment of traders, and whether employees support official plans and forecasts.  ―Even 
when market predictions are inaccurate, executives can use trader behavior to understand 
organizational alignment and employee engagement‖ (Corporate Executive Board, 2006).  
This allows executives the opportunity to make necessary changes to strategic and 
operational plans. 
For Microsoft, the biggest surprise was how little some people cared about 
the accuracy of internal markets.  What actually sold most on these 
markets was their ability to aggregate opinions quickly into an easily 
decipherable set of predictions.  Even if the predictions were wrong, the 
point was that this was the outcome that traders believed, and knowing 
that was very useful. (Todd Proebsting, Microsoft) 
It is important to look at the results to determine what they are providing, and 
whether the predictions are accurate. 
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V. PRIVATE SECTOR APPLICATIONS AND RESULTS 
The current corporate applications for internal prediction markets include sales 
forecasting, project execution, product design, trend forecasting, and resource allocation.  
Sales forecasting predicts the likely volume of sales in dollars or units.  Project execution 
predicts when projects will reach their planned milestones.  Product design forecasts 
which product features or enhancements customers will prefer.  Trend forecasting reveals 
new or existing market, technology, or customer trends.  Resource allocation enables 
business units to trade resources according to their needs, and can be used to support 
objectives such as corporate social responsibility (Corporate Executive Board, 2006).  
Table 2.   Experiences of Early Adopters (From Malone, 2004 & Kiviat, 2004) 





Hewlett-Packard used an internal market system to 
forecast printer sales with considerable accuracy. Front 
line sales employees exchanged contracts representing 
the future sales volume based on their predictions of 
future printer sales. When trading ended, the contract 
valued most highly represented the most likely sales 
range. HP‘s official forecast erred by 13%, while the 
market erred by 6%. In further trials, the market 
performance exceeded the accuracy of official forecasts 




Eli Lilly applied internal markets to predict correctly 
which of six potential new drugs would have the 
greatest success in passing product development 
hurdles. Employees involved in different stages of drug 
development traded market contracts based on their 
information. The market aggregated information with 
accuracy and opinion detail that would not have 




Google uses internal markets to forecast events such as 
new product launch dates and new office openings. The 
company applies market predictions to determine the 
likelihood that an event will occur and on a specific 
date. 




BP set up an internal market to reduce the oil 
company‘s greenhouse gas emissions. Each business 
unit was granted the right to generate a certain amount 
of emissions and given access to an electronic trading 
system that allowed it to buy more emissions capacity 
or sell excess capacity to other units. The market 
approach enabled BP to achieve its targeted reductions 




Siemens used internal prediction markets to predict 
software project milestones.  On one occasion, 
traditional methods suggested a software project would 
be delivered on time, but the prediction market 
suggested it would be 2–3 weeks delayed.  The project 




Microsoft uses internal markets to predict whether 
projects will meet milestones articulated in their project 
plans.   
A. HEWLETT-PACKARD 
An internal market at HP produced more accurate forecasts of printer sales than 
the firm‘s internal processes (Chen & Plott, 2002).  A total of 12 predictions were 
performed over a period of three years.  The prediction markets at HP included 
predictions for eight products.  In some cases, dollar sales were predicted, and in other 
cases, the number of units sold was predicted.  The market design employed at HP was 
the web-based double auction market of Marketscape software, developed at the 
Laboratory of Economics and Political Science at Caltech (Chen & Plott, 2002).  From 
the web interface, participants could enter a buy offer, a sell offer, or acceptance of an 
offer.  If a trade was possible, it was executed; if not, the order was placed in an order 
book.  According to Plott and Sunder (1988), experiments involving single compound 
securities can have difficulty with information aggregation.  As such, HP decided to use a 
complete set of state contingent contracts (Chen & Plott, 2002).  For example, if HP 
wanted to predict future sales of a product, they would establish a prediction market with 
multiple securities with each having an interval of say 100 units.  Therefore, there would 
be a security for 0–100 units sold, 101–200 units sold, and so on.  Depending on the 
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interval in which the final outcome falls, the corresponding security pays one dollar per 
share; all other securities pay nothing.  The payoff for HP markets involved real money in 
which the ―winning‖ security paid off a fixed amount; all other securities paid nothing.  
HP had issues engaging employees to participate in an activity in which they may lose 
money (Chen & Plott, 2002).  Thus, HP supplemented participants with money at the 
beginning of the market sessions to ensure participation and minimize the potential 
employee loss.  The markets at HP typically included 20–30 people, mostly from the 
marketing and finance divisions (Chen & Plott, 2002).  Additionally, about five 
participants were from HP Labs, who had little or no information about the predicted 
event, but provided additional liquidity to the market.   
The results were that the internal market predictions were closer to the actual 
outcome than the official forecast in six out of eight events (Chen & Plott, 2002).  These 
results are very promising for using prediction markets to predict future sales, compared 
to traditional forecasting. 
B. SIEMENS 
Siemens has used prediction markets for software projects.  Ortner (1998) 
describes an experiment at Siemens in which an internal market predicted the firm would 
fail to deliver a software project on time even when traditional planning tools suggested 
the deadline could be met.  The Siemens market, like HP, used a fully computerized 
double auction market with a software product called FX developed by Kumo, Inc. 
(Ortner, 1998).  For this software project, Siemens created two separate prediction 
markets.  One asked a simple question: ―Can the project be finished in the planned time 
horizon?‖  The payoff rule was a simple winner-take-all design.  The current market price 
for this security predicts the probability of meeting the planning time horizon.  The 
second market was designed to predict the length of the possible delay.  This market 
included two shares called ―Early‖ (or YES) and ―Late‖ (or NO).  The payoff structure 
for this market was set up in a linear fashion.  The YES share paid the maximum of (1–
0.2*weeks late) or zero.  The NO share paid the minimum of (0.2*weeks late) or one.  
For example if the price of the YES share was trading at 0.8, the market believes there 
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will be a one-week delay.  Conversely, if the NO share was trading at 0.2, the market 
believes there will be a one-week delay.  This payoff structure is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Pay-off Structure at Siemens (From Ortner, 1998) 
Siemens opened the market to all people working in the project except upper level 
management.  Sixty-three traders joined the market and about 50 became active traders.  
Of the participant pool, 67% were developers, 31% group managers, and 2% project 
managers (second level–first level managers were not allowed to join the experiment, 
because of their manipulating power) (Ortner, 1998).  The Siemens market did not use 
any uninformed traders. 
Results: Initially, after opening the two markets, the winner-take-all market YES 
shares approached a price of 0.43 and fluctuated between 0.43 and 0.40 for 
approximately six weeks.  About one month prior to the deadline, the YES shares for the 
winner-take-all market plummeted indicating the market did not believe the project 
would reach its planned milestone, although it was still possible according to the 
traditional project plan used by the management team  (Ortner, 1998).  In the end, the 
market was closed when the project manager announced the milestone time limit was not 
reached.  Therefore, each YES share paid zero and the NO shares paid one.  In the second 
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market, used to predict the time delay, after only one month of trading and more than 
three months before the scheduled deadline, the market predicted a delay of two to three 
weeks.  In the end, the actual delay turned out to be 11 workdays. 
HP and Siemens‘ experiences suggest that motivating employees to trade is a 
major challenge.  Both firms ran real money exchanges, with a relatively small trading 
population (20–60 people), and subsidized market participation by either providing 
traders with a portfolio or matching initial deposits.  Even with the subsidies and small 
trading population, the predictive performance of these markets was remarkable. 
C. MICROSOFT 
Microsoft uses internal markets to predict whether projects will meet milestones 
articulated in their project plans.  Microsoft‘s market relies on an automated market 
maker that enables traders to access the market at their convenience to buy and sell 
contracts.  By using a market maker, traders can exchange contracts without relying on 
others‘ willingness to buy or sell.  Microsoft uses multiple contracts, each representing a 
different predicted date on which a project will reach a certain milestone.  Microsoft also 
has run experimental markets in the past involving naïve and informed traders.  ―Naïve 
traders did not impact the accuracy of market predictions because informed traders 
corrected market price fluctuations caused by naïve participants‖ (Corporate Executive 
Board, 2006).  However, Microsoft currently limits participation to informed traders 
because uninformed traders are less likely to participate.  Microsoft selects its traders by 
targeting employees who have enough information to make educated trades, and selecting 
traders from different corporate functions to aggregate different types of information, 
giving more accurate results (Corporate Executive Board, 2006).  The only concern is 
leaving out someone who has information, but management is unaware of their having 
sufficient information.  Microsoft encourages participants to trade when they think they 
can contribute to the market. 
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VI. OTHER “REAL WORLD” APPLICATIONS AND RESULTS 
A. IOWA ELECTRONIC MARKET 
The Iowa Electronic Market, run by the University of Iowa, is probably the best-
known prediction market among economists.  The Iowa Electronic Market uses a double 
auction market with winner-take-all and index contract types.  It is a real money market 
with no endowment, and participation is open to anyone interested, but likely only 
attracts those particularly interested and aware of the market‘s existence.  In 1988, the 
original Iowa experiment allowed trades in a contract that paid 2½ cents for each 
percentage point of the popular vote in the presidential election received by Bush, 
Dukakis, and others.  More recently, it has run prediction markets based on the 2008 
presidential election, the 2008 congressional elections, and the 2008 Minnesota senate 
election.  The Iowa Electronic Markets has yielded both very accurate predictions and 
also outperformed large-scale polling organizations (Berg, et al., 2001).  Figure 3 shows 
data from the four U.S. presidential elections between 1988 and 2000.  The horizontal 
axis shows the number of days until the election, and the vertical axis displays the 
average absolute error between the prediction market price (linked to the two-party share 
of the popular vote) and the actual popular vote percentage earned in the election.  In the 
last week before the election, the prediction markets have predicted vote shares with an 
average absolute error of approximately 1.5 percentage points, compared to the final 
Gallup poll forecasts that differed by 2.1 percentage points (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004).  
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Figure 3.   Information Revelation Over Time (From Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004) 
The superior performance of the Iowa markets may be attributable to the fact that 
―traders are self-selected with a clear interest in predicting what will actually happen, 
rather than what they hope will happen‖ (Corporate Executive Board, 2006).  In a poll, 
respondents predict events without any context of others‘ beliefs.  In a prediction market, 
each participant knows the current consensus and factors this information into decision-
making. 
B. GOLDMAN SACHS AND DEUTSCHE BANK “ECONOMIC 
DERIVATIVES” MARKET 
Another example of the relative performance of a prediction market comes from 
the ―Economic Derivatives‖ market established by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank.  
This market is tied to macroeconomic outcomes, such as non-farm payrolls, retail sales, 
levels of the Institute for Supply Management‘s manufacturing diffusion index, and 
initial unemployment claims (Gürkaynak & Wolfers, 2005).  The market mechanism is a 
pari-mutuel system where for a given strike price all bets that the specified outcome 
either will or will not occur are pooled; this pool is then distributed to the winners in 
proportion to the number of options purchased.  The Economic Derivatives market uses 
multiple contracts, allowing traders to take a position on specified ranges the data will 
fall in.  The outcome results in a probability density function, which prior to this market 
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was unavailable.  Figure 4 compares the performance of the Economic Derivatives 
market with a survey of economists in predicting economic outcomes based on data 
gathered by Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2005).  They show that the market-based forecast 
encompasses the information in the survey-based forecasts.  Additionally, the markets‘ 
response to data releases are better captured in the market-based expectations than 
survey-based expectations, suggesting the markets perform and react better than survey-
based forecasting (Gürkaynak & Wolfers, 2005).   
 
 
Figure 4.   Forecasting Economic Outcomes (From Gürkaynak & Wolfers, 2005) 
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Table 4 summarizes some of the more popular prediction markets available for 
public trade. 
Table 4.   Popular Prediction Markets 
Market Focus 
Iowa Electronic Markets 
<www.biz.iowa.edu/iem> 
Run by University of Iowa 
 
Small-scale election markets. 
Centrebet 
<www.centrebet.com> 
For profit company 
Northern Territory bookmaker, offering 
odds on election outcomes, current 
events, sports, and entertainment. 
Economic Derivatives 
<www.economicderivatives.com> 
Run by Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank 
 
Large-scale financial market trading in 




For profit company 
Political, finance, current events and 
sports markets.  Also technology and 




Nonprofit research group 
 
Political, financial, current events, 
science, and technology events suggested 
by clients. 
Hollywood Stock Exchange 
<www.hsx.com> 
Owned by Cantor Fitzgerald 
 
Success of movies, movie stars, and 
awards.  Data used for market research. 
Intrade 
<www.intrade.com> 
For profit company 
Political, financial, current, and similar 
event futures. 
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VII. APPLICATION TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
ACQUISITION PROCESS  
The main DoD application presented here is in performance management of 
acquisition programs.  Specifically, markets provide insight on whether the organization 
will meet performance targets (e.g., schedule, budget, and specifications).  If the market 
predicts a performance gap, resources can be quickly re-deployed in response, or kill the 
project to save time and money. 
One of the key problems in project management is controlling projects already 
started and responding to issues that may arise unintentionally (Ortner, 1998).  It is very 
important to receive as much up-to-date information as possible on the progress of the 
project from within the group of people working on that project.  Project management 
techniques, like milestone trend analysis, should help recognize delays and other 
problems that might occur as soon as possible, but significant bad news, like delays, 
technical problems, or budgetary problems are not often voluntarily passed along due to 
the fear of negative feedback.  Prediction markets provide a way for individuals to pass 
information anonymously, which enables management to receive timely information as to 
the status of a project.  Management can then react as necessary to correct any 
deficiencies that may exist.  Management involvement will be discussed later. 
In order to achieve organizational buy-in, the DoD should initially position 
prediction markets as an experimental tool.  This approach proves less threatening than 
immediately using markets as a replacement tool for traditional forecasting.  The markets 
can supplement traditional forecasts and indicate if the traditional forecasts should be 
revised (Corporate Executive Board, 2006).  If the markets are successful, they may be 
used in other areas where traditional methods do not exist to provide more information to 
management. 
There are several criteria that should be examined to determine if a prediction 
market would be beneficial in a given application.  In determining whether to use a 
prediction market or not, management should examine if a contract can be easily 
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defined, if there is a known end point or date, if there are enough participants, and the 
markets should not include issues where management decisions will affect the market 
outcome before it closes. 
A. CONTRACT 
Defining the contract is key to the market‘s success.  The contract should be 
defined in such a way that it is easy to understand, so that all participants know what they 
are purchasing and what the pay-off structure is.  It may be better initially to limit the 
outcomes to a YES or NO; for example, will a project be completed on time or not?  
Once traders are familiar with how markets work, then more complicated markets can be 
devised with outcomes such as how many weeks early or late will the project be 
completed? 
B. END POINT 
Knowing when to end a market is important so that traders know there is a 
deadline.  Knowing there is an endpoint will also provide incentives for traders to trade.  
An endpoint should be selected such that management has time to take corrective actions 
if the results are not acceptable.  For example, the military would not want a market 
indicating that a project is going to be late to end two days before the project‘s deadline.  
It is more beneficial for the market to end sooner so that management can take action to 
correct deficiencies where needed, or divert resources to the project.  The difficulty in 
choosing the endpoint is that the market must have a well-defined outcome for the event 
covered by the stock when it ends.  If you directly predict an event in which DoD is 
interested, either the market must end before the event, in which case you don‘t have the 
result, or the market close is too late to be useful.  One way markets have avoided this is 
to predict something that is not of direct management interest (e.g., projected orders for 
Google so they could plan production quantities; the management decision was 
production plans not hitting a sales target).   
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C. PARTICIPANTS 
The selection of traders is also key to the success in the DoD.  As discussed 
earlier, the group should be diverse, so that different information is brought to the 
prediction market.  The traders need to be decentralized, so that they are not overtly 
influenced by upper-level management.  In addition, the selected individuals need to be 
independent, so that they pay attention mostly to their own information and do not worry 
about what everyone around them thinks. 
D. MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT 
As mentioned above, a prediction market‘s results allow management to receive 
timely information, and react to correct any deficiencies revealed by the prediction 
market.  However, management reaction to what the prediction market is predicting prior 
to the market closing can, and will, change the outcome of the prediction.  This would 
undermine the results of the market, and discourage users to participate in the market.  
This is where selection of the end date becomes important, so that management can react 
to the market without adversely affecting the market‘s results while still open.  The 
securities cannot be issues in which management will intervene as prices predict 
outcomes or the markets lose integrity.  Predicting sales volume helps management set 
production levels, but if management increases advertising it will undermine the market.  
This becomes critical for the DoD.  The DoD is an organization that likes to react to 
current information available.  As discussed, reacting too early to information revealed by 
the prediction market will affect the outcome of the market.  There has to be a 
conscientious effort not to react immediately to the information provided until the market 
ends.  
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Prediction markets may prove to be a successful way to manage acquisition 
programs.  The most notable success documented in this thesis is HP.  HP ran markets of 
similar types that could be used by the DoD.  HP also showed that relatively small 
markets (approximately 20 people) were successful and provided accurate predictions. 
The important elements for DoD market design include defining the contract, 
determining the end point, selecting participants, and management involvement.  Define 
the contract in such a way that it is easy to understand, so that all participants know what 
they are purchasing and what the pay-off structure is.  An endpoint should be selected 
such that management has time to take corrective actions if the results are not acceptable.  
Knowing there is an endpoint will also provide incentives for traders to trade.  The 
participation pool should be diverse, so that different information throughout the 
organization is brought to the prediction market.  The traders need to be decentralized, so 
that they are not overtly influenced by upper-level management.  If the DoD can design a 
prediction market with these elements in mind, and successfully employ the prediction 
market, market outcomes will provide valuable information to stake holders in the DoD. 
Additional research should be conducted to evaluate (in an experiment setting) the 
effectiveness of these elements in determining the accuracy of the prediction market 
outcome. 
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